The study of cognitive evolution comparatively is one of the main focuses of my current theoretical investigation. My contributions can be found in my articles published in 2015, 2017, and 2019. In these articles, I have focused on the evolution of cognition comparatively, resulting in the advancement of a theory to explain the qualitative differences between humans and non-human animals. 

 

However, my 2023 article is focused not on comparative cognition itself but on providing an epistemological ground to explain the legitimacy of anthropomorphism as a potential source for a general methodological approach to understanding the evolution of cognition. A clear view of such an approach is not only of significant importance for theorists of science whose focuses are on methodological issues in comparative cognition but may also have practical implications for those who work in the fields of cognitive science in general and specifically those who use animal models of human function in translational research that require paying closer attention to the relationship between studies of human and nonhuman animals.

 

In the following sections, I will first describe the outline for the theoretical formulation of cognitive evolution in my 2015, 2017, and 2019 articles, and then I will describe a general outline for some of my epistemological as well as methodological arguments formulated in my last contribution in 2023 in the field.   

 

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A Theoretical contribution in 2015:

 

The main contribution of the 2015 analysis is that the pattern of exploratory locomotion displayed by rats follows the laws of group similar to those followed by infants’ behaviour as demonstrated by Jean Piaget. Given such common baseline, the construction of cognitive subsystems in rats (and even that of chimpanzees) is very primitive compared to humans. Thus, the behavior loses its explanatory power as the "motor of evolution" suggested by Piaget. In other words, superior human's ability to abstract logico-mathematical constructs from behaviour is probably one of the main causes of a qualitative difference between humans and nonhumans.        

 

 

Nemati, F. (2015). From parallel mathematical description of action to unparalleled outcome of abstraction: A comparative analysis. Archives of Neuroscience, 2: e2257. DOI: 10.5812/archneurosci.22573.

   

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* For access to a pdf version of the above article please click here. 

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A Theoretical contribution in 2017: 

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1. The highly structured and innate exploratory locomotion displayed by rats reveal characteristics such as stopping patterns that can be modeled as a group of integers modulo n (Z, +).

 

2. Parallel structure of spatial behaviour displayed by rodents and by humans may only represent a superficial resemblance mediated by different brain circuits.

 

3. Human's superior cognitive capacity can be explained based on the abstraction of computational patterns generated by neuronal firings in relevant brain areas. 

 

 

Nemati, F. (2017). A theoretical framework to explain the superior cognitive competence in humans: A role for the division of labour in the brain. Archives of Neuroscience, 4:e36107. DOI: 10.5812/archneurosci.36107.​​​​

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* For access to a pdf version of the above article please click here. 

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A Theoretical contribution in 2019: 

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My 2019 article encompasses a theory that addresses the problem of unreasonable effectiveness mathematics in natural sciences as described in the previous section (Mathematics & Science). However, it is also an outline for understanding cognitive evolution in general. Such general approach to the evolution of cognition is inspired by the notion that our mathematical reasoning is the most fundamental tool we humans have when aiming at solving problems for which a computational approach would be reasonable to adopt. 

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A Theoretical contribution in 2023:

 

This contribution is in fact a methodological formulation of anthropomorphism in the context of scientific activities. Two main questions raised when discussing anthropomorphism in the context of comparative cognition are:

 

1) Is it objective?

2) Is it useful?

 

These are the questions that are formulated to motivate a broader question about anthropomorphism: “Is anthropomorphism a scientifically legitimate practice?” However, understanding the legitimacy of anthropomorphism as a scientific activity is not confined to the potential answers to these questions, because the last question can reformulate the questions of “Is it objective?” or “Is it useful?” to the questions of “Can it be objective?” or “Can it be useful? 

 

My analysis of the examples in the history and philosophy of science (mainly in physics) indicates that reconsideration of such potential questions is only possible if one takes all aspects of scientific activities into account. Neglecting such a view when discussing anthropomorphism in comparative cognition had led to the continuation of the notion that anthropomorphism is neither an objective nor a useful method and therefore not a legitimate approach to scientific inquiry. I have argued that anthropomorphism can be both objective and useful by developing a theoretical framework with strong implications for examining the objectivity of theory-building in comparative cognition In the following article:

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Nemati, F. (2023). Anthropomorphism in the Context of Scientific Discovery: Implications for Comparative Cognition. Foundation of Sciences 28, 927–945. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-021-09821-1 

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* For access to a full view-only version of the above article please click here. 

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Translational Research:

 

In order to further discuss the implications of the methodological strategies in developing animal models of human functions as discussed in my 2023 paper on comparative cognition mentioned above, and how they might relate to translational research as a means to conducting health-related studies in general and developing therapeutic interventions for psychopathologies in particular, it is helpful to look at one of my experimental studies entitled “Stress and risk avoidance by exploring rats: implications for stress management in fear-related behaviours” published in 2013. The study as I have discussed in my 2023 paper is a successful work in revealing the potential role of risk assessment as a mechanism to avoid the risk of unpleasant experiences or dangers that has led to fear-related behaviours in rats. The epistemological/methodological aspects of such legitimate (in my view) application of so-called anthropomorphic attributions have been discussed in my 2023 paper and provides the rationale to apply such research strategy in a “bench-to-bedside” move from animal studies in basic sciences to the treatment options for patients in the hospital.   

 

I am hopeful that inspired by the discussion emerged in the Philosophy of Physics in the past century, I can work further on the theory that I had developed in 2016 [not submitted yet] to address this problem with a more quantitative approach.

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